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Amnesia and the Defendant's Competency
to Stand Trial: Morrow v. State, 293 Md.
247, 443 A. 2d 108 (1982)
by Barbara R. Gathright

Introduction and
Background
Recently, in Morrow v. State, 293
Md. 247, 443 A.2d 108 (1982), the
Court of Appeals of Maryland held
that a defendant's amnesia does not
compel a finding of incompetence.
In the same opinion the court reflected a case-by-case approach to
the issue of competency and disavowed a policy which requires a
post-trial determination of the defendant's status. The court stated
that amnesia need not affect the
normal interplay between attorney
and client, nor does it necessarily
cause unfairness to the defendant.
Id.
Joseph Morrow was driving on
Belair Road when his car collided
head-on into another vehicle. He
sustained head injuries from the
crash, and a passenger in his car
died from injuries also sustained in
the accident. Morrow was indicted
on several charges, the most serious
of which was manslaughter by
automobile. Before trial Morrow requested and received a competency
hearing based on his assertion that
he suffered post-traumatic amnesia.
The Circuit Court for Baltimore
County adjudged Morrow competent to stand trial and found him
guilty of manslaughter. The court of
appeals granted certiorari to address the question of whether a defendant who cannot remember the
facts of the incident for which he is
charged is incompetent to stand trial.
Id.
Amnesia is a memory disturbance
characterized by total or partial inability to recall events from the past.
T. Stedman, Stedman's Medical Dictionary 53 (24th ed. 1982). Post-traumatic amnesia, like that suffered by

Morrow, can follow a head injury.
Id. It is generally accepted that
everyone is amnesic to a certain degree. Morrow v. State, 293 Md. at
254, 443 A.2d at 112 (1982). Traditionally, the amnesiac condition has
been viewed with great suspicion
since the condition is easily feigned.
W. Curran, A. McGarry and C.
Petty, Modern Legal Medicine, Psychiatryand Forensic Science 795 (1980).
The origins of the amnesiac defendant's status at trial are rooted
in common law considerations of
competency. These considerations
were codified by Congress in 1949
in 18 U.S.C. §4244. This statute, still
in effect, established the test of
competency to be whether the accused is "unable to understand the
proceedings against him or properly to assist in his own defense."
18 U.S.C. §4244 (1976). Today almost all jurisdictions have a similar
statute in force.
In Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S.
402 (1960), the United States Supreme Court interpreted the competency standard to mean "whether
[the accused] has sufficient present
ability to consult with his lawyer with
a reasonable degree of rational
understanding and whether he has
a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against
him." This test is widely accepted
as the modern constitutional standard to determine a defendant's competency to stand trial. R. Roesch and
S. Golding, Competency to Stand Trial
11 (1980).
When the accused is an amnesiac,
however, a minority of jurisdictions
have adopted a different approach.
In Wilson v. United States, 391 F.2d

460 (D.C. Cir. 1968), the court focused on the issue of "fairness" to
the amnesiac defendant when it applied a six-factor test for competency that expanded the prevailing
Dusky test. In Wilson, the defendant
sustained a severe head injury prior
to his arrest and had no memory of
the incident for which he was indicted. The appellate panel reviewed the trial court's findings of
competency and remanded the case
for factual findings based on the following six-factor test: (1) the extent
to which the amnesia effects the defendant's ability to consult with his
lawyer; (2) the extent to which the
amnesia affects his ability to testify
on his own behalf; (3) whether the
evidence can be extrinsically reconstructed; (4) whether the government has aided in this reconstruction; (5) the strength of the
defendant's case; and (6) any other
relevant facts or circumstances. Id.
at 463-464. The court in Wilson also
held that there must be a determination of the amnesiac's competence before and after trial. Id. at
463.

The Maryland Law
In 1888 the Court of Appeals of
Maryland adopted the M'Naghten
rule for determining both the sanity
and the competency of the defendant. Spencer v. State, 69 Md. 28, 13
A. 809 (1888). The M'Naghten rule
is derived from M'Naghten's Case
[1843] 10 CL and Fin 200, 8 E.R. 718,
which held that the defendant bears
the burden of proving that he is unable to distinguish right from wrong
and that he could not understand
the nature and consequences of his
act. This rule prevailed at common
law until the Maryland General Assembly adopted the federal standard for determining competency.
1967 Md. Laws 709, (current version
at Md. Health-General Code Ann.
§12-101(c)(1982)). Although the language of the 1982 recodification varies slightly from its predecessor, the
substance of the test remains the
same: "whether such person is unable to understand the nature of the
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object of the proceedings against him
and to assist in his own defense."
Cf. Md. Ann. Code art. 59, §23 (1979)
and Md. Health-General Code Ann.
§12-101(c) (1982).
The Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland applied the competency
test in Strawderman v. State, 4 Md.
App. 689, 244 A.2d 888 (1968), cert.
denied, 252 Md. 733 (1969). In Strawderman the court invalidated the
M'Naghten rule and substituted the
statutory language. The court determined that the tests for criminal
responsibility and for competency
were clearly different, thus bifurcating the insanity defense. The
Strawderman decision clarified these
two areas and established different
standards of proof for each. Id.
In Raithel v. State, 280 Md. 291,
372 A.2d 1069 (1977), predating
Morrow, the court of appeals focused on the trial judge's rulings in
a competency hearing and reaffirmed the validity of the Dusky
competency standard in this jurisdiction. (In Maryland, the competency of the defendant is determined in a formal hearing even
though the language of the relevant
statute requires only that "evidence
presented on the record" be used
by the court for its determination.
Md. Health-General Code Ann. §12102(a) (1982)). At a pre-trial hearing,
the trial court in Raithel found the
defendant competent to stand trial.
Thereafter, a jury convicted him of
first degree murder and other offenses. The court of appeals held
that the trial court erred by failing
to determine at the pre-trial competency hearing whether the defendant could assist in his own defense. This error was reversible error
since both prongs of the Dusky test
were not met. Id.
On only one occasion has a Maryland appellate court cited the Wilson
six-factor test discussed earlier. See
James v. State, 31 Md. App. 666, 358
A.2d 595, cert. denied, 278 Md. 725
(1976). In James, the defendant
sought to utilize the six-factor test,
but the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland distinguished Wilson and
stated that the Wilson test applies

only when the defendant's amnesia
is genuine; in James the defendant's
loss of memory was either feigned
or caused by an alcoholic black-out.
Id.
Prior to the Morrow decision,
Maryland courts followed the federal standards of Dusky and required a pre-trial hearing on the issue of competency; the divergent
procedure and approach advocated
in Wilson were not recognized.
However, until Morrow, the competency of a defendant suffering
from a genuine case of amnesia remained an issue of first impression
in Maryland.

The Morrow Rationale
In determining whether an amnesiac defendant is competent to
stand trial, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland in Morrow relied on the
policies that "amnesia is present to
some degree in everyone" and that

the amnesiac defendant is realistically in no worse position than many
other defendants who do not have
important facts before them. Rebutting the procedure advocated by
the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia in Wilson, the Maryland court stressed the clear language of the applicable statute.
Morrow v. State, 293 Md. 247, 443
A.2d 108 (1982).
The language of the statute, cited
by the court as "a model of clarity,"
Id. at 255, 443 A.2d at 113, requires
that the trial court determine the issue of competency prior to or during the trial if it appears to the court
or if it is alleged by the defendant
that the defendant is incompetent.
See Md. Ann. Code art. 59, §23 (1979)
(current version at Md. Health-General Code Ann. §12-102(a)(1982)).
Furthermore, the court may, in its
discretion, reconsider the competency issue at any time during the
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trial and before the verdict is rendered. Id. The Maryland statute does
not require a post-trial hearing on
the competency question, nor does
it advance the six-factor test of Wilson.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland found highly persuasive an Indiana case with a fact pattern similar to the facts of Morrow. See Reagon
v. State, 253 Ind. 143, 251 N.E.2d
829 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1042
(1970). In Reagon the defendant sustained an injury to his head which
resulted in a genuine loss of memory. Supporting the determination
that the defendant received a fair
trial, the court of appeals in Morrow
cited the Reagon rationale:
[m]any times in a trial of a criminal case evidence is lost, a material witness dies, or as in this
case, the defendant has amnesia as to certain events or a time.
Still, such handicaps from a defendant's point of view cannot
prevent a trial from taking place
eventually. Rarely would we
find a case in which a defendant could not contend that he
was deprived of some evidence
and therefore he ought not to
be tried.
Morrow v. State, 293 Md. at 254, 443
A.2d at 112 (1982).
Thus, while the Wilson six-factor
test may be gaining acceptance in
other jurisdictions, in Maryland the
two-pronged competency test of
Dusky continues to be the standard.
Declining to take a case-by-case approach to the determination of an
amnesiac's competency, the appellate court chose to follow the precise
wording of the statute and to rely
on the trial court's ability to properly apply the law so as to preserve
the fairness of the trial.

Analysis of the Morrow
Decision
Holding that Morrow received a
fair trial, the court of appeals followed the mainstream of opinion on
the competency issue. One argument in favor of this holding is the

presumption that amnesia may easily be feigned; therefore, the defendant's allegations of incompetence may not be worthy of elevation
"to the dignity of legal incompetence." Fajeriakv. State, 520 P.2d 795,
801 (Alaska 1974). Another argument supporting the fair trial theory
focuses on the problem of what to
do with the amnesiac defendant.
Public policy dictates that he should
not be allowed to go free if there is
a strong case against him. State v.
Pugh, 117 N.J. Super. 26, 283 A.2d
537 (1971). Yet, it seems fundamentally unfair to allow commitment
proceedings when the defendant has
not been tried and found guilty. M.
Guttmacher and H. Weihofen, Psychiatry and the Law 164-170 (1952).
The majority opinion in Morrow
emphasized the ability of the defendant's counsel to adequately
prepare a defense. The amnesiac
defendant may maintain that he is
unduly prejudiced by his memory
loss because he cannot reconstruct
the events that led to the charges
against him. Morrow v. State, 293 Md.
at 255, 443 A.2d at 113 (1982). However, in most cases the State's files
are open to the defense, and this is
considered by the courts to be
enough to cancel any prejudice that
might otherwise occur. The court in
Morrow alluded to this open file policy and was thus apparently satisfied that the record reflected "full
access, prior to trial, to information
used by the State." Id. at 256, 443
A.2d'at 114.
Application of the Wilson six-factor test probably would not have
aided the defendant in Morrow because the test is essentially a balancing of two considerations. Wilson balances the inherent prejudice
to the defendant with the strength
of the case against the defendant,
while taking into consideration
whether the prosecution has cooperated in opening their files. In view
of the strong circumstantial case
against Morrow, the Wilson test
probably would not have changed
the outcome of the case.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland found the Wilson requirement

of a post-trial determination of competency to be unduly burdensome
for the trial court. The Maryland
statute permits the trial judge to
conduct a hearing at any time until
the verdict is rendered. This safeguard apparently satisfies the conscience of Maryland's highest court.
A post-trial determination of the
competency issue would be unnecessary for the trial court. The court
of appeals has thus chosen to rely
on the trial court's ability to protect
the defendant's constitutional rights
pursuant to the statutory procedure.

Conclusion
In Morrow v. State, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland has followed
the trend of its prior case law and
joined the mainstream of opinion
on the competency issue as it relates
to the amnesiac defendant. A public
policy argument based on practicality and expediency is one of several rationales. Public policy supports the notion that the amnesiac's
situation is similar to that of other
defendants who are tried without
all of the evidence at their disposal.
Additionally, the defendant's ability to reconstruct the evidence
through information received from
the State alleviates any unfairness.
While other jurisdictions evidenced a greater concern for the
amnesiac's competency to stand trial
than the Maryland courts, the Morrow decision stands for the proposition that the Maryland statute affords sufficient protection of the
defendant's rights. Therefore, in
Maryland, the defendant's competency can be questioned at any time
prior to or during the trial. However, once the verdict is rendered,
an amnesiac defendant must use the
appellate process for further determination of that issue. Thus, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland has
accepted the rationale that the defendant may be entitled to a fair trial,
but not a perfect one.

